16 judgments of the Delhi High Court, the Rohini Court, New Delhi and 2 other courts applying Copyright Act s.51, from 2023–2026, each with a headnote by BRB Legal.
Injunction refused over a remixed version of the song 'Tirchi Topiwale', but the Court secured the plaintiff's position pending trial. It read the 1988 assignment agreement, which defined "record" to include any disc, tape, perforated roll and all other devices "now or hereafter known" in which sounds are embodied, as contemplating technical advances not envisaged in 1988. That language was held wide enough to cover dissemination, broadcasting and communication of remixed versions through digital music platforms, so royalties may be payable on the digital exploitation.
Suit decreed against a content creator who copied the plaintiff's course materials, likeness and persona, with the intermediaries proceeded against ex parte. Beyond a permanent injunction, the Court framed relief aimed at the platform: removal and de-indexing of infringing material and future uploads, deactivation of the infringer's advertising accounts with steps to prevent new ones, monitoring to prevent re-uploads through newly created accounts, and enforcement of the platform's own repeat infringer, reused content and monetisation policies. It also required a prompt, fair and transparent grievance mechanism under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 that gives due weight to prima facie evidence and prevents misuse of counter-notification.
Both cross suits dismissed after trial. The Court held that the book 'The House of the Blue Mangoes' does not infringe copyright in 'Golden Stag', and that the infringement suit was not barred by limitation. On the publisher's side, the claim for groundless threats did not survive once the author filed her own infringement suit, and no defamation was made out: a person who, in good faith, tells an interviewer that she believes her case has merit while the matter is sub judice does not thereby defame the opposite party. Neither party was granted damages and each bears its own costs.
Application to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 dismissed. The Court held that the grounds advanced went to the alleged weakness of the plaintiff's claims under an agreement and power of attorney rather than to the absence of a cause of action, and that the applicant had conflated the requirement that a plaint disclose a cause of action with the quite different task of establishing it at trial. Whether the power of attorney was one coupled with an interest under section 202 of the Contract Act, and what follows from the death of one of several principals in a contract of agency, were questions for final disposal.
Software piracy suit decreed where the defendants did not file a written statement, the Court proceeding under the principle in Order VIII Rule 10. Permanent injunction granted against copying, reproducing, storing, installing or using unlicensed copies of the plaintiff's software, together with delivery up under section 58 of all unlicensed copies and the duplicating equipment used, including computers, disc writers, stampers, hard disks, packaging, labels and advertising material.
Interim injunction granted over two songs used in a film. The Court held the plaintiff had exclusive copyright in the audio-visual recording, the sound recording and the underlying literary and musical works as original and independent works, and that the copyright had not lapsed under section 19(4) by the date of suit. The defendants' use was neither fair use nor de minimis. On a point that recurs in music licensing, the Court held that the plaintiff was not prohibited from issuing a licence merely because it was neither a registered copyright society nor a member of one, section 33 notwithstanding, and that the fee demanded was not excessive, unreasonable or exorbitant, nor was there delay in communicating it.
Appeal partly allowed on commercial disparagement. The Division Bench agreed that a prima facie case was made out as to specific remarks about the broadcaster, which it held were made without any independent standard or basis and were ex facie disparaging. Continued online availability would cause serious and irreparable harm not compensable in money, and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, both parties operating in the same industry and the defendants having a substantial user base.
Summary judgment granted under Order XIII-A in a software piracy suit. With nothing on record to suggest the plaintiffs' statement of facts was false or incorrect, and no material to show the defendants' use of the STAAD and SACS software at two offices was authorised or licensed, infringement was taken as established. A permanent injunction followed restraining copying, reproducing, storing, installing or using unlicensed copies.
Appeals dismissed with costs. An assignee's rights are confined to what the first owner of the copyright actually granted. Here the appellant had been given the right to dub the film into Telugu and exploit that version in theatres and in television in specified areas; satellite rights had never been assigned to it under the agreement, so it could not restrain the party to whom the producer had specifically granted those rights from exploiting the film by satellite. The argument built on the omission of the word "original" from section 13(1)(b) in relation to cinematograph films did not assist, since the appellant could not expand the right it had been granted.
Ad hoc licensing arrangement continued pending higher adjudication. The Court held that the observations in Azure Hospitality about a non-society owner licensing at another society's tariff rates must be treated as stayed, because the paragraph giving effect to them had itself been stayed, and because the Supreme Court's clarification confined the benefit of those orders to the parties before it, so no third party may use copyrighted works without an appropriate licence. With the underlying question of whether the plaintiff can issue licences without registration as a copyright society under section 33(3) sub judice before the Supreme Court, the interim arrangement was simply extended.
Suit for copyright infringement in tractor engineering drawings dismissed after trial, each party bearing its own costs. The Court held on the evidence that the drawings met the requirement of originality under the Copyright Act and that the plaintiff was entitled to be recognised as their author, and on that footing rejected the objection that the suit failed for non-joinder of the foreign parent. The suit nevertheless failed on the critical question of copying: the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant had copied its drawings, and the remedies claimed for copyright infringement therefore did not arise.
Interim application disposed of without adjudicating the substantive dispute, for want of pleadings. The plaintiff's interim relief had been sought in respect of the staging of a musical based on the suit film, and consent terms with two defendants had rendered that application infructuous. The Court held that the wide language of the prayer could not be extended to cover a proposed new film without amendment of the pleadings to demonstrate prima facie infringement, and that the question whether the new storyline was a remake or a sequel, and whether the remake right under the assignment agreement was rightly invoked, could not be considered in the absence of such pleadings. Although it had called for the script in a sealed cover, it declined to look at it and returned it sealed.
Suit dismissed after trial. The Court found against the plaintiff on infringement, holding that the defendant was entitled to exploit the musical works by any and every means whatsoever under the subject agreements, which disposed of the claim to damages as well. On royalties it recorded that the defendant conceded an entitlement under the agreements and that payments had been made from time to time including for non-physical exploitation, which the plaintiff had refused to accept, leaving the parties to work out payment on the basis of the agreements and the Court's findings. Parties to bear their own costs.
Interim relief granted in a dispute over a film song said to be based on a dhrupad composition, with the Court shaping a remedy around attribution rather than suppression. It found a prima facie case of copyright infringement and held the balance of convenience with the plaintiff because, once the film and song lose their audience by the time trial concludes, the possibility of effective acknowledgment would be lost, causing irreparable injury to the creative and moral rights of composers who are no longer alive. The singers of the impugned song were disciples of the plaintiff's family, which the Court treated as showing the intricate link between the compositions.
Suit decreed against ex parte defendants for unlicensed public performance of a copyright society's repertoire at live music events. The Court held that a copyright society registered with the Central Government is permitted under sections 18, 19 and 33 of the Copyright Act, 1957 to grant licences and collect royalty on behalf of its members, and that the evidence of the society's licensing executive and its investigator established that the songs performed at the event in question were published by its members. In the absence of any contrary evidence, the society was entitled to the injunctive relief claimed and to rendition of accounts with a decree of profits. The first defendant had agreed while the suit was pending to settle for Rs.20,00,000 with GST but paid only about Rs.9,90,000 and repeatedly violated undertakings given to the Court, so the plaintiff was directed to give credit for the amounts received and prosecute the suit on merits. On counsel's submission that the balance would be paid, the decree for rendition of accounts was made conditional: it comes into effect only if the outstanding amount is not paid by the stated date, and payment is to be treated as discharge of that obligation. Applications alleging wilful disobedience of interim injunctions were closed without separate orders because the permanent injunction and rendition of accounts were being granted in the judgment itself.
Interim injunction granted against CHAKRA KOHLU but refused against CHAKRIKA and CHAKRESH. CHAKRA KOHLU reproduces the whole of the registered mark CHAKRA and merely adds a word, and the defendant's own rectification petition had averred that the marks were textually, phonetically and visually similar and bound to cause confusion. That admission could not be escaped by calling it a cut and paste error or by switching to the alternative plea that CHAKRA was descriptive. CHAKRIKA and CHAKRESH are single compound words which cannot be vivisected to isolate CHAKR, and registration of CHAKRA gives no monopoly over Hindi words beginning with that syllable. The Court added that mere registration of a mark is not infringement under section 29: absent evidence of use of CHAKRIKA, no interlocutory injunction could issue in respect of it.
