17 judgments of the Delhi High Court, the Rohini Court, New Delhi and 3 other courts applying Copyright Act s.14, from 2023–2026, each with a headnote by BRB Legal.
Injunction refused over a remixed version of the song 'Tirchi Topiwale', but the Court secured the plaintiff's position pending trial. It read the 1988 assignment agreement, which defined "record" to include any disc, tape, perforated roll and all other devices "now or hereafter known" in which sounds are embodied, as contemplating technical advances not envisaged in 1988. That language was held wide enough to cover dissemination, broadcasting and communication of remixed versions through digital music platforms, so royalties may be payable on the digital exploitation.
Suit decreed against a content creator who copied the plaintiff's course materials, likeness and persona, with the intermediaries proceeded against ex parte. Beyond a permanent injunction, the Court framed relief aimed at the platform: removal and de-indexing of infringing material and future uploads, deactivation of the infringer's advertising accounts with steps to prevent new ones, monitoring to prevent re-uploads through newly created accounts, and enforcement of the platform's own repeat infringer, reused content and monetisation policies. It also required a prompt, fair and transparent grievance mechanism under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 that gives due weight to prima facie evidence and prevents misuse of counter-notification.
Appeals dismissed in a dispute over royalties for underlying works in sound recordings. The Division Bench held that Saregama has no legal authority or competence to grant a licence in respect of the underlying musical and literary works incorporated in a sound recording, and that Vodafone cannot commercially exploit those underlying works without express permission from the Indian Performing Right Society. Agreements between Vodafone and the sound recording companies could not negate IPRS's right to royalties where that right otherwise exists, and such agreements do not survive section 19(10) to the extent they are read as denying it. Some of the agreements in fact recorded that IPRS was entitled to royalties on commercial exploitation.
Both cross suits dismissed after trial. The Court held that the book 'The House of the Blue Mangoes' does not infringe copyright in 'Golden Stag', and that the infringement suit was not barred by limitation. On the publisher's side, the claim for groundless threats did not survive once the author filed her own infringement suit, and no defamation was made out: a person who, in good faith, tells an interviewer that she believes her case has merit while the matter is sub judice does not thereby defame the opposite party. Neither party was granted damages and each bears its own costs.
Rival claims to first ownership of copyright in a feature film resolved in favour of the plaintiff: his suit decreed and the cross suit dismissed. Because no issues had been framed in the later suit, the Court recast common issues for both. On the contest over who produced the film, it held that a certificate of the Central Board of Film Certification naming another applicant and producer is strong evidence that the film was completed and was viewed by the examining committee, but is no more than prima facie evidence of who the producer is, and must be weighed with the rest of the evidence, the more so where the rival claimant holds a certificate for the same film under a different title. On the evidence, the plaintiff's contemporaneous handwritten shooting ledger, his agreements with the lead cast, music composer, dance master, cinematographer and lyricist, and the original bound script were decisive. The counter claimant's agreements had been executed by a partnership firm that was not in existence on their dates, he asserted that the bound script was in his possession but never produced it, and he led no evidence for his allegation that the plaintiff had misappropriated the ledger. The plaintiff was therefore the person who took the initiative and responsibility for making the film, which made him the producer under section 2(uu) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and the first owner of copyright under section 17, so that the exclusive rights in section 14 accrued to him. The dates on which the rival suits were instituted were held not to be determinative.
Interim injunction granted over two songs used in a film. The Court held the plaintiff had exclusive copyright in the audio-visual recording, the sound recording and the underlying literary and musical works as original and independent works, and that the copyright had not lapsed under section 19(4) by the date of suit. The defendants' use was neither fair use nor de minimis. On a point that recurs in music licensing, the Court held that the plaintiff was not prohibited from issuing a licence merely because it was neither a registered copyright society nor a member of one, section 33 notwithstanding, and that the fee demanded was not excessive, unreasonable or exorbitant, nor was there delay in communicating it.
Appeal partly allowed on commercial disparagement. The Division Bench agreed that a prima facie case was made out as to specific remarks about the broadcaster, which it held were made without any independent standard or basis and were ex facie disparaging. Continued online availability would cause serious and irreparable harm not compensable in money, and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, both parties operating in the same industry and the defendants having a substantial user base.
Summary judgment granted under Order XIII-A in a software piracy suit. With nothing on record to suggest the plaintiffs' statement of facts was false or incorrect, and no material to show the defendants' use of the STAAD and SACS software at two offices was authorised or licensed, infringement was taken as established. A permanent injunction followed restraining copying, reproducing, storing, installing or using unlicensed copies.
Appeals dismissed with costs. An assignee's rights are confined to what the first owner of the copyright actually granted. Here the appellant had been given the right to dub the film into Telugu and exploit that version in theatres and in television in specified areas; satellite rights had never been assigned to it under the agreement, so it could not restrain the party to whom the producer had specifically granted those rights from exploiting the film by satellite. The argument built on the omission of the word "original" from section 13(1)(b) in relation to cinematograph films did not assist, since the appellant could not expand the right it had been granted.
Suit dismissed. The plaintiff, who had conceived an awards event, was an employee of the defendant company at the time the concept note and feasibility study were prepared by its team, and so could claim no author's special right of attribution or of restraint against distortion under section 57. He also failed to show any agreement to share revenue from exploitation of the event. With no infringement established, the claims to injunction, punitive damages, rendition of accounts and costs all fell away, and the injunction against broadcast had in any event become infructuous as the event had already aired.
Interim application disposed of without adjudicating the substantive dispute, for want of pleadings. The plaintiff's interim relief had been sought in respect of the staging of a musical based on the suit film, and consent terms with two defendants had rendered that application infructuous. The Court held that the wide language of the prayer could not be extended to cover a proposed new film without amendment of the pleadings to demonstrate prima facie infringement, and that the question whether the new storyline was a remake or a sequel, and whether the remake right under the assignment agreement was rightly invoked, could not be considered in the absence of such pleadings. Although it had called for the script in a sealed cover, it declined to look at it and returned it sealed.
Suit dismissed after trial. The Court found against the plaintiff on infringement, holding that the defendant was entitled to exploit the musical works by any and every means whatsoever under the subject agreements, which disposed of the claim to damages as well. On royalties it recorded that the defendant conceded an entitlement under the agreements and that payments had been made from time to time including for non-physical exploitation, which the plaintiff had refused to accept, leaving the parties to work out payment on the basis of the agreements and the Court's findings. Parties to bear their own costs.
Interim relief granted in a dispute over a film song said to be based on a dhrupad composition, with the Court shaping a remedy around attribution rather than suppression. It found a prima facie case of copyright infringement and held the balance of convenience with the plaintiff because, once the film and song lose their audience by the time trial concludes, the possibility of effective acknowledgment would be lost, causing irreparable injury to the creative and moral rights of composers who are no longer alive. The singers of the impugned song were disciples of the plaintiff's family, which the Court treated as showing the intricate link between the compositions.
Suit decreed against ex parte defendants for unlicensed public performance of a copyright society's repertoire at live music events. The Court held that a copyright society registered with the Central Government is permitted under sections 18, 19 and 33 of the Copyright Act, 1957 to grant licences and collect royalty on behalf of its members, and that the evidence of the society's licensing executive and its investigator established that the songs performed at the event in question were published by its members. In the absence of any contrary evidence, the society was entitled to the injunctive relief claimed and to rendition of accounts with a decree of profits. The first defendant had agreed while the suit was pending to settle for Rs.20,00,000 with GST but paid only about Rs.9,90,000 and repeatedly violated undertakings given to the Court, so the plaintiff was directed to give credit for the amounts received and prosecute the suit on merits. On counsel's submission that the balance would be paid, the decree for rendition of accounts was made conditional: it comes into effect only if the outstanding amount is not paid by the stated date, and payment is to be treated as discharge of that obligation. Applications alleging wilful disobedience of interim injunctions were closed without separate orders because the permanent injunction and rendition of accounts were being granted in the judgment itself.
Plaintiff held to have made out a prima facie case that under its agreement with the producer of the film Moodu Pani it owns the sound recordings and the underlying musical and literary works, so the first defendant could not use a re-recorded version of the song without a licence. Balance of convenience, however, lay with the defendant, whose film was due for release the following day and which had invested substantially in recreating the recording. The Court allowed the song to be used on the defendant depositing Rs. 30 lakh, the licence fee the plaintiff had itself indicated, with the Registrar General within two days, failing which the defendant stood injuncted. All rights and contentions were left open.
Summary judgment under Order XIII-A CPC and the suit decreed. The question was whether a sanyasi can own copyright in literary works of his creation, the defendant contending that a renunciate relinquishes all rights in property on entering a religious order. The Court held that copyright vests in a person by virtue of his labour and skill and subsists under section 17, and once vested can be extinguished only by a mode known to law. Civil death on entering a religious order does not prevent subsequent acquisition and holding of private property, as Shri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir records, and the law of copyright protects a man's rights irrespective of his status as a family man or a saint. In any event there was a categorical written assignment by the author to the plaintiff Trust, registered with the Charity Commissioner.
Rectification allowed under section 50 of the Copyright Act and the Registrar directed to expunge the respondent's registration for the artistic work. Where there is substantial similarity between two works, the later work cannot be said to be original. The respondent's work was a slavish imitation of the petitioner's GULCHHARE artwork used since 2009, and the distinguishing elements did not affect the substantial similarity or the imitation. The Court applied the tests used to compare label marks in a passing off action to the comparison of labels that are artistic works, and noted the principle that where dishonesty is apparent, greater attention is paid to the points of similarity and less to the points of difference.
