7 judgments of the Delhi High Court, the Orissa High Court and 2 other courts applying Trade Marks Act s.31, from 2023–2026, each with a headnote by BRB Legal.
Appeal allowed and the interlocutory injunction set aside. Beyond the shared element "Jeeva" and "Jiva", the Division Bench found no visual or conceptual similarity between the competing trade dresses: the appellants' mark features herbal plants while the respondents' consists of a lotus flower. The phrase "By Baidyanath" in the appellants' mark operates as a source identifying feature, and together with the prefix "Shatam" produces sufficient dissimilarity that confusion or association does not arise. Passing off failed independently for want of misrepresentation, which remains a crucial ingredient, and no material was placed on record showing actual or likely damage to goodwill. Having found no deceptive similarity, the Court did not examine goodwill and damage.
Appeals dismissed and an injunction upheld in a dispute over a restaurant name. The appellants could not be treated as permissive users, the mark in question being the very mark registered in favour of the respondents, and the appellants' use for restaurants and like activities was allied and cognate to the registered specification. A prima facie case of infringement with likelihood of confusion under section 29(2)(b) was therefore made out, and following Midas Hygiene an injunction had to follow.
Appeal allowed and an injunction set aside for want of any finding on goodwill. The Division Bench held that in passing off the plaintiff must establish sufficient goodwill and reputation in the asserted mark before the defendant's user commenced, a position crystallised by the Supreme Court in Toyota and Pernod Ricard, and that the Commercial Court had made no examination of goodwill at all. It declined to remand for a finding, holding that no case was made out even on misrepresentation or deceptive similarity.
Appeal against refusal of interim relief dismissed. Where a rectification petition against the plaintiff's own registration is pending, section 124(1)(b)(i) requires the suit to be stayed until it is determined, and although section 124(5) preserves the power to grant interim relief, its exercise is discretionary. The District Judge was entitled to assess whether a sufficiently strong prima facie case had been made out and to find none, there being no sufficient material that the relevant class of consumers was likely to be confused. Authorities affirming the statutory presumption of confusion under section 29 were distinguished as decided where validity was not in issue.
Final orders deferred and four questions referred to a Larger Bench on an issue that affects a large number of cases: whether a suit for infringement lies at all against the proprietor of a registered trade mark in respect of the use of that mark; if it does, whether an interlocutory injunction can be granted against such use; whether such an injunction can issue without first proceeding through the sequence contemplated by section 124, namely a section 30(2)(e) defence, a plea of invalidity in response, the Court being satisfied that the plea is tenable, an issue being framed, the suit adjourned for three months, rectification initiated within that period and trial stayed pending its outcome; or whether a bare plea of invalidity in the plaint suffices. The Bench recorded a conflict between Raj Kumar Prasad, followed in Corza, and another view.
Operation of the judgment dismissing the suit stayed pending appeal, and the interim injunction that had run in the trial court since January 2012 continued. The Division Bench held that the trial court's finding that the defendants were the prior user was perverse, the plaintiff's mark having been registered abroad in 1954 and in India on April 25, 1979, against the defendants' adoption in 1992, with no justifiable explanation for that adoption. Questions on whether the person who affirmed the plaint had to enter the witness box, and whether the suit was maintainable for want of filing by an authorised person, were left to the hearing of the appeal.
Appeal allowed, the temporary injunction set aside and the application remanded for fresh consideration. The District Judge had rested the injunction on the plaintiff's registration alone, with no discussion of prior user, of sections 31 and 34 of the Trade Marks Act, or of the defendant's documents, and only a cryptic treatment of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The Court held that while a mini trial is not justified at the injunction stage, that does not relieve the trial judge of the duty to analyse the ingredients. Order 41 Rules 23 to 27 CPC, including the powers of remand and to admit additional evidence, apply to appeals from orders through Order 43 Rule 2. The respondent's request that the injunction continue during the remand was refused: once the appeal is allowed setting the injunction aside, a contrary order on the same lines cannot be passed.
